United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961) by Foster, Stephen H.
Montana Law Review
Volume 23
Issue 2 Spring 1962 Article 8
January 1962
United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961)
Stephen H. Foster
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Legal Shorts is brought to you for free and open access by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Montana
Law Review by an authorized editor of The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law.
Recommended Citation
Stephen H. Foster, United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961), 23 Mont. L. Rev. (1961).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol23/iss2/8
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
AN ACCOUNTANT EMPLOYED BY AN ATTORNEY IS WITHIN THE ATTOR-
NEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE.-Defendant accountant was subpoenaed to appear
before a federal grand jury to give testitmony concerning his communica-
tions with a taxpayer under investigation for alleged federal income tax
violations. These communications were made pursuant to his employment
by the law firm representing the taxpayer. Defendant invoked the attor-
ney-client privilege and refused to answer questions concerning the finan-
cial affairs of the taxpayer. After being apprised by the federal district
court that he had no privilege, defendant persisted in his claim of privilege
and refused to answer, whereupon he was held in contempt of court and
sentenced to one year in prison. On appeal to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held, reversed. ' Communications to an
accountant who has been employed to interpret and relay information to
an attorney are within the attorney-client privilege. United States v. Kovel,
296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961).
It is settled that communications made in confidence by a client to an
attorney for the purpose of obtaining legal advice are protected from dis-
closure.! This privilege is given on grounds of public policy in order that
the client may make known to his lawyer all the facts without fear that
the attorney may be compelled to reveal such information confided to him.'
The privilege may not be invoked unless the communication was intended
to be confidential.' Therefore, communications made by a client to his at-
torney in the presence of a third person ordinarily are not privileged
However, where the assistance of an agent is necessary to facilitate com-
munications between an attorney and his client, or to render other services
in the process of giving legal advice, communications to such agent, as dis-
tinguished from other third persons, are within the privilege.! The reasons
for this extention of the privilege are founded in necessity :'
. . . the complexities of modern existence prevent attorneys from
effectively handling the clients' affairs without the help of others;
few lawyers could practice without the assistance of secretaries,
'The court remanded to the district court for a determination of the factual ques-
tion which was necessary to provide the basis for deciding whether the privilege
existed.
'Blankenship v. Rowntree, 219 F.2d 597 (10th Cir. 1955); Kent Jewelry Corp. v.
Keefer, 202 Misc. 778, 113 N.Y.S.2d 12 (Supp. Ct. 1952) ; Shelly v. Landry, 97 N.H.
27, 79 A.2d 62G (1951) ; Ex parte Ochse, 38 Cal. 2d 230, 238 P.2d 561 (1951) ; Boyles
v. Cora, 232 Iowa 822, 6 N.W.2d 401 (1942).
8
'=ohn v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 2d 500, 267 P.2d 1065 (1954) ; In re Selser, 15 N.J.
393 (1954) ; Modern Woodmen of America v. Watkins, 132 F.2d 352 (5th Cir. 1942).
'United States v. Shibley, 112 F. Supp. 734 (S.D. Cal. 1953), affd, 236 F.2d 238 (9th
Minn. 15, 62 N.W.2d 688 (1954) ; Falkenhainer v. Falkenhainer, 198 Misc. 29, 97
Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 873 (1966) ; Brown v. Saint Paul City Ry. Co., 241
N.Y.S.2d 467 (Sup. Ct. 1950) ; Piersky v. Hocking, 88 Mont. 358, 292 Pac. 725 (1930).
5State ex rel. Headrick v. Bailey, 365 Mo. 160, 278 S.W.2d 737 (1955) ; Tracy v.
Tracy, 377 Pa. 420, 105 A.2d 122 (1954) ; Willard C. Beach Air Brush Co. v. General
Motors Corp., 188 F. Supp. 242 (D.N.J. 1953) ; In re Fisher's Will, 67 Ohio App. 6,
35 N.E.2d (1941).
eState v. Kociolek, 23 N.J. 400, 129 A.2d 417 (1957) (psychiatrist) ; Schmitt v. Emory,
211 Minn. 547, 2 N.W.2d 413 (1942) (claim agent) ; Foley v. Poschke, 137 Ohio St.
593, 31 N.E.2d 845 (1941) (detective) ; Leyner v. Leyner, 123 Iowa 185, 98 N.W. 628
(1904). This principle has been recognized at common law as well as by statute.
See, e.g., Madame Du Barr6 v. Livette, Peake 108, 170 Eng. Rep. 96 (N.P. 1791)
(interpreter) ; State v. Loponio, 85 N.J.L. 357, 88 Atl. 1045 (Ct. Err. & App. 1913)
(amanuensis).7Instant case at 921,
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file clerks, telephone operators, messengers, clerks not yet ad-
mitted to the bar, and aides of other sorts.
One particular area of modern living which has become very complex
and which gives rise to many legal problems is that of taxation. Neces-
sarily incident to taxation are the accounting methods and systems which
form the basis for computation of taxes and the keeping of records for tax
purposes. Many accounting systems are extremely complicated and in giv-
ing legal advice concerning tax problems, attorneys often require the as-
sistance of accountants.8 Because of this, it would seem that accountants
assisting attorneys should be within the attorney-client privilege. How-
ever, such has not always been the case. In Hinmuelfarb v. United States,'
the earlier leading case on the question," a lawyer hired an accountant
to aid him in preparing the defense of a client against a charge of income
tax evasion. In the Himmelfarb case the court recognized that where the
presence of a third person is essential to communications between an at-
torney and his client, the privilege will enjoin disclosure of such com-
munications. The court said, however, that the presence of an acountant
at the conference between an attorney and client was a convenience and
not a necessity.
In holding that the privilege was applicable to an accountant-agent,
the court in the instant case expressly refused to assume that the services of
an accountant to an attorney are a mere convenience. It recognized that
an accountant may be essential in order for the attorney to understand
the accounting concepts, and the accounts themselves, which may be in-
volved in his client's case.'
While the instant case firmly establishes the proposition that an ac-
countant employed by an attorney may be within the atorney-client privi-
lege, it also provides a guide for the application of the privilege to such
accountants. For the purposes of illustration, the court in the instant
case examined four hypothetical situations, each involving a language inter-
preter employed to translate the story of a client who speaks a foreign
language. The court suggests that these situations would be privileged.
Furthermore, the court suggests that the principles dictating such a con-
8Lourie and Cutler, Lawyer'8 Engagement of Accountant in a Federal Tax Fraud
Ca8e, 10 TAX L. REv. 227 (1954-1955).
9175 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860.
l°Lourie and Cutler, op. cit. supra note 8. It should be noted that few courts have
passed on the inclusion of an accountant within the attorney-client privilege.
However, there is some dictum supporting the position in the Himmelfarb case.
See Gariepy v. United States, 189 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1951); United States v.
Stoehr, 100 F. Supp. 143 (M.D. Pa.), affd, 196 F.2d 276 (3d Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 982 (1957). Apparently, the English courts, as early as 1863,
have held contra to the Himmelfarb case. See Malsham v. Stainton, 71 Eng.
Rep. 357 (1863; Lourie and Cutler, op. cit. supra note 8.
"Defendant conttended that he was an agent within the New York Civil Practice
Act, section 353, which provides that: "An attorney . . . shall not disclose . . . a
communication, made by his client to him, . . . in the course of his professional
employment, nor shall any clerk, stenographer or other person employed by such
attorney ... disclose, or be allowed to disclose any such communication .... In
regard to that contention the court said, first, that it doubted the applicability of
the statute in a federal grand jury proceeding, and, secondly, the "decision of the
issue is unnecessary, for there is nothing to indicate that the New York legislature
intended to do more than enact the principles of the common law." Instant case at
921, n.2.
1962]
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clusion would be equally applicable o an accountant who interprets ac-
counting data for an attorney because: "Accounting concepts are a foreign
language to same lawyers in almost all cases, and to almost all lawyers in
some cases. "'
Two of these hypothetical cases involved (1) an attorney sending his
client, who speaks only a foreign language, to an interpreter for a literal
translation of the client's story, and (2) an attorney hiring an interpreter
to be present when he confers with his client. In each situation the agent
is indispensable to the attorney who cannot understand his client's lan-
guage. The only difference between the two situations is the locality in
which the interpreter performs his services. No authority was found which
suggests that the place where the agent performs services for an attorney
affects in any manner the applicability of the attorney-client privilege to
such agent. Clearly, both should be privileged.
The courts third hypothetical case is one in which the client brings an
interpreter to the interview with the attorney. Again, the services of the in-
terpreter are essential and the fact that the client, rather than the attorney,
has employed the agent will not destroy the privilege," As stated by Wig-
more:"
The client's freedom of communication requires a liberty of em-
ploying other means than his own personal action. The privilege
of confidence would be a vain one unless its exercise could be thus
delegated. A communication, then, by any form of agency em-
ployed or set in motion by the client is within the privilege.
The court's fourth hypothetical case is one in which the attorney
sends his client to an interpreter who has instructions to interview the
client in the attorney's behalf. The interpreter is then to prepare for the
attorney a summary translation of the client's story to help the attorney
give proper legal advice. The distinction the court makes between the pre-
vious three situations and this fourth situation is that in the former the
literal translations were merely ministerial tasks,' while here the prepara-
tion of the summary was a service demanding more of the interpreter's
skill. However, as the court suggests, the privilege is not confined to agents
who render only ministerial services."8 Illustrative of this principle is
State v. Kociolek," where an attorney, representing a client charged with
murder, hired a psychiatrist to determine whether the defendant was in-
'Instant case at 922.
'aMileski v. Locker, 14 Misc. 2d 364, 178 N.Y.S.2d 911 (Sup. Ct. 1958) ; Wojciechow-
ski v. Baron, 274 Wis. 264, 80 N.W.2d 434 (1957) ; State v. Loponlo, 85 N.J.L. 357,
88 Ati. 1045 (Ct. Err. & App. 1913)
"8 WIGMoRE, EviDENcE § 2317 (McNaughten rev. (1961).
'"Ministerial" is ordinarily a word of art in the law and pertains to an act which
is to be performed in a given state of facts in a prescribed manner in obedience to
the mandate of legal authority without the exercise of discretion. See State ez rel.
Lee v. Montana Livestock Sanitary Bd., 135 Mont. 20, 339 P.2d 487 (1959) ; Kansas
Milling Co. v. Ryan, 152 Kan. 137, 102 P.2d 970 (1940). The court in the instant
case, however, used the word "ministerial" as descriptive of services to be per-
formed, without discretion, in a manner prescribed by the employer.
'See State v. Hunt, 25 N.J. 514, 138 A.2d 1, (1958) (psychiatrist) ; In re Bates, 167
Ohio St. 82, 146 N.E.2d 306 (1957) (physician) ; Cold Metal Process Co. v. Aluminum
Co. of America, 7 F.R.D. 684 (D. Mass. 1947) (metallurgist).
'"-0 N.J. 400. 129 A.2d 417 (1957).
[Vol. 23,
3
Foster: United States v. Kovel
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1961
RECENT DECISIONS
sane. Although the psychiatrist's services were more than ministerial,'
the court held that he was within the attorney-client privilege.
However, a case involving an accountant who is acting essentially as
an interpreter for a lawyer must be distinguished from a possible fifth
hypothetical case in which the court in the instant case said that the
privilege would not be applicable. That sitluation is where the client tells
his story to an accountant for the purpose of obtaining either accounting
service or the accountant's own advice. In examining this situation it must
be remembered that the attorney-client privilege is restricted to communica-
tions made for the purpose of "obtaining legal advice from a lawyer.' '"
The courts have not recognized accounting service or advice, including the
preparation of income tax returns, as constituting legal advice. ' Thus,
facts learned by an accountant in rendering such accounting services as
keeping financial accounts and computing tax returns for the client would
not be privileged, and the fact that a lawyer has been consulted about the
same matter, either before or after the communication to the accountant,
will not render that communication privileged.' Similarly, facts learned
by an accountant in giving accounting advice, as distinguished from ac-
counting service, are not privileged. '
Another possible variation of this fifth hypothetical case is where a
taxpayer employs an accountant as his counsel before the Internal Revenue
Service. Accountants are qualified to represent taxpayers in administra-
tive proceedings of the Internal Revenue Service. ' However, there are no
federal statutes or regulations recognizing privileged communications in
such administrative proceedings, and no privileges would be available, as
a matter of right, unless (1) the law of the state in which the proceeding
is held grants a privilege to the communications involved, and (2) the state
law is applied in the proceeding." In administrative proceedings in which
the law of any state having a statutory =ccowntant-client privilege ' is
'It is submitted that such an examination conducted by a psyhciatrist would neces-
sarily involve the exercise of his judgment and discretion and could not be said to
be a "ministerial" service as that term was used by the court in the instant case.
"
'Instant case at 922. See United States v. United Shoe Mfg. Co., 89 F. Supp. 357
(D. Mass. 1950) ; State v. Addington, 158 Kan. 276, 147 P.2d 367 (1944) ; Solon v.
Lichtenstein, 39 Cal. 2d 75, 244 P.2d 907 (1952).
'See, e.g., In re Fisher. 51 F.2d 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1931) ; Olender v. United States, 210
F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 982 (1957).
"See San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. Superior Court, 55 Cal. 2d 451, 359 P.2d
925 (1961) ; Grand Lake Drive-In, Inc. v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 2d 122, 3
Cal. Rptr. 621 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
' The courts have not distinguished between accounting service and accounting ad-
vice. Therefore, it would seem that communications made for the purpose of ob-
taining accounting advice, as well as iccounting service, are privileged. See 8upra
note 19.
"Treas. Reg. § 10.3 (1958).2 4Apparently the federal courts are not in accord as to whether state law, concerning
privileged communications, must be applied. Compare Falsone v. United States,
205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 864, with Baird v. Koerner, 279
F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960).
2'At least fourteen jurisdictions have enacted statutes granting a privilege directly
to communications between accountants and their clients: ARMI. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 32-743 (1956) (certified public accountants and public accountants) ; CoLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 153-1-7 (1953) (certified public accountants) ; FLA. STAT. ANN.
§473.15 (1952), (certified public accountants and public accountants); GA. CODE
ANN. § 84-216 (1955) (certified puplic accountants) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. C. 110Y2, § 52
(Smith-Hurd, 1954) (public accountants) ; IOWA CODE ANN. § 116.15 (1946) (regis-
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adopted, the suggestion of the court in the instant case as to the extent of
the applicability of the attorney-client privilege to accountants would be
irrelevant because the conversation would be privileged on another ground,
namely, on an accountant-client privilege. Likewise, in administrative
proceedings not adopting state law and recognizing no privileged com-
munications of any kind, this limitation of the attorney-client privilege
would not be relevant because it presupposes the existence of such a privi-
lege. However, if an administrative tribunal adopts the law of any state
having no accountant-client privilege the limitation would be relevant. The
court in the instant case would limit the attorney-client privilege to com-
munications made for the purpose of securing legal advice from a lawyer.
Thus, although the accountant, in serving as an advocate in an administra-
tive tax proceeding, is performing a function of a lawyer, he is not actually
a lawyer," and would not be within the privilege. It is submitted that the
limitation suggested by the court in the instant case, as it applies in this
situation is sound. The attorney-client privilege suppresses relevant,, and
perhays vital, evidence, and for that reason the privilege is strictly con-
strued.' If a privilege between accountant and client is considered to be
desirable, it should be granted by Congress and the state legislatures and
not by the judiciary.'
Thus, the principles developed in the instant case concerning the attor-
ney-client privilege as it applies to accountants boil down to these: (1) the
privilege includes accountants who are involved in the attorney-client
relationship; (2) the applicability of the privilege to an accountant is not
dependent upon where he performs his services, nor upon whether he is
employed by the attorney or the client, nor upon whether or not his services
are ministerial; (3) where the accountant is consulted for his own advice
or solely for accounting service, rather than for the purpose of interpret-
ing accounting data for a lawyer, the privilege is lost.
tered practioners) ; Ky. REv. STAT. § 325.440 (1959) (certified public accountants
and public accountants) ; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:85 (1950) (certified public ac-
countants and public accountants) ; MID. ANN. CODE art. 75A, § 11 (1957) (certified
public accountants and public accountants); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 18.23 (1957)
(certified public accountants and public accountants; NEv. REv. STAT. § 48.065
(1957) (accountant); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 67-23-26 (1953) (certified or registered
public accountants) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-114 (1955) (certified public accountants
and public accountants) ; PuERTo Rico LAWS ANN. tit. 20, § 790 (1955) (certified
public accountants and public accountants.)
'Apparently the minimum requirement is general legal training for the purpose of
admission to the bar. See Georgia-Pacific Plywood Co. v. United States Plywood
Corp., 18 F.R.D. 463 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) ; Zenith Radio Corp v. Radio Corp. of America,
121 F. Supp. 792 (D. Del. 1954) ; 8 WIGMORE, EvIDENCE § 2300 (McNaughton rev.
1961).
OFoster v. Hall, 29 Mass. (12 Pick). 89 (1831) ; City and County of San Francisco
v. Superior Court, 161 Cal. App. 2a 823, 327 P.2d 195 (1958).
'It should be noted that a similar problem could arise in the Tax Court of the
United States as accountants, possessing certain qualifications, may be admitted to
practice before that court. See Tax Court Rules of Practice, Rule 2. The rules
of evidence applied in the Tax Court are those applicable in a trial without a jury
in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Tax Court Rules
of Practice, Rule 31(a). There is no accountant-client privilege available in the
District of Columbia, but an attorney-client privilege is recognized. See Clark v.
Turner, 183 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1950) ; Cafritz v. Koslow, 167 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir.
1948). Thus, whether or not an accountant acting as counsel would be within the
attorney-client privilege depends on whether an accountant, for this purpose, is to
be considered at attorney.
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There have been no cases in Montana pertaining to the question of
whether or not the attorney-client privilege includes agents within the at-
torney-client relationship. The Montana statute which defines the attor-
ney-client privilege makes no reference to the attorney's agents.' How-
ever, it was settled at common law that the agents of the attorney were
within the privilege.' Further, at least twenty-two states have adopted
statutes which are similar to the Montana statute in not expressly includ-
ing agents of the attorney,8' and the uniform construction of these statutes
has been to include such agents.' In view of these factors, it may be ex-
pected that Montana will adopt a similar construction.
It is not surprising that the question has not been presented in Mon-
tana concerning accountants as agents, for the problem seems to arise most
frequently in federal tax litigation. However, the problem could easily
arise in other areas of litigation, and if it does, the instant case provides a
sound guide for its solution.
STEPHEN H. FOSTER
REGULATIONS ADOPTED BY MILK BOARD TO BE VALID MUST BE WITHIN
AUTHORITY DELEGATED BY STATUTE.-The Milk Control Board charged
that defendant had furnished milk dispensers to fraternities free of charge,
thus violating fair-trade practices established by an official order of the
Board issued in 1959. The district court sustained general demurrers to
the plaintiff's complaint on the basis that the complaint failed to state a
cause of action. On appeal to the Montana Supreme Court, held, affirmed.
The regulations as to unfair trade practices adopted by the Board in 1959
are invalid as they did not cover all of the five provisions required by
statute to be included in the regulations. Montana Milk Control Board v.
Community Creamery Co., 366 P.2d 151 (Mont. 1961).
The statute' under which the Milk Board enacted its 1959 order gov-
erning fair-trade practices states:
"'An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any com-
munication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course
of professional employment." REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 93-701.4.
'See, e.g., Madame Due Barr6 v. Livette, Peake 108, 170 Eng. Rep. 96 (N.P. 1791)
Jackson ex dem. Haverly v. French, 3 Wend. (N.Y.) 337, 20 Am. Dec. 699 (1829);
State v. Brown, 2 Marv. (Del.) 380, 36 Atl. 458 (1896).
nALASKA COMp. LAWS ANN. § 58-6-4 (1949) ; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-601 (1947) ; IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 9-203 (1948) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-1714 (1946) ; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-2805 (1949) ; Ky. REV. STAT. § 421.210 (1959) ; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:475
(1951) ; MICH. STAT. ANN § 28.945 (1) (1954) ; Mo. ANN. STAT § 491.161 (1952) ;
NEn. REV. STAT. § 25-1201 (1956) ; N.D. REV. CODE § 31-0106 (1943) ; OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2317.12 (Page, 1954) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 385 (Supp. 1959) ;
OREL. REV. STAT. § 44.040(1) (b) (1957) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 321 (1958) ; S.D.
CODE § 37.0101 (1939) ; TENN. CODE: ANN. § 29-305 1955) ; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROc.
ANN. art. 713 (1941) (applies to both civil and criminal proceedings) ; WASH. REV.
CODE § 5.60.060 (1958) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4992 (1955) ; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 325.22
(1958) ; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 3-2602 (1945)
'See, e.g., Jayne v. Bateman, 191 Okla. 272, 129 P.2d 188 (1942) ; Foley v. Poschke,
137 Ohio St. 593, 31 N.E.2d 845 (1941). It should be noted, however, that not all
of the states referred to 8upra note 31 have passed on the question.
'Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, 27-414, as amended, Laws of Mont. 1959, ch. 192,
1 8, (Hereinafter REVISED CODES OF MONTANA will be cited R.C.M.)
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